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LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
1. Kristi Pace, Appellant, is an individual, and the surviving spouse of the decedent, 
William Matthew Pace. 
2. The Estate of William Matthew Pace, Appellant, is all individuals or entities that 
may have an interest at law or in equity in the remaining assets and obligations of 
the decedent William Matthew Pace. 
3. St. George City Police Department, Appellee, is a governmental agency operating 
under the City of St. George. 
4. The City of St. George, Appellee, is a governmental entity, and is an incorporated 
city within the State of Utah. 
2 
Table of Contents 
List of All Parties Page 2 
Table of Authorities Page 4 
Statement of Jurisdiction Page 5 
Statement of Issues Page 5 
Standard of Review Page 5 
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions Page 6 
Statement of Case Page 6 
Statement of Facts Page 7 
Summary of Argument Page 7-8 
Argument Page 8-16 
Conclusion Page 16 
Signature of Counsel of Record Page 17 
Proof of Service Page 18 
Addendum Page 19 
3 
Table of Authorities 
Gurule v. Salt Lake County. 2003. 69 P.3d 1287.474 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 2003 UT 25. 
Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 1998, 955 P.2d 343,339 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. 
Youren v. Tintic SchoolDist. 343 F.3d 1296 (10thCir. 2003). 
Goeble v. Salt Lake City S R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80 §§ 38-40,104 P.3d 1185). 
Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). 
Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). 
Shafer v. State, 79 P.3d 936 (Utah 2003). 
Busch v. Salt Lake Intern. Airport, 921 P.2d 470 (Utah 1996). 
Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40,440 P.2d 15 (1968). 
Civil Actions Against State and Local Government § 3:16. Police and Fire Protection. 
Civil Actions Against State and Local Government § 3:17. Operation of Prisons. 
Adamson v. City ofProvo, 819 F.Supp. 934 (Utah 1993). 
Sandberg v. Lehman, Jensen & Donahue, L.C., 76 P.3d 699,478 Utah Adv. Rep. 29. 
2003 UT App 272 (2003). 
Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 1995, 904 P.2d 677 (1995). 
Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996). 
Kirkv. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987). 
Johnson v. City of Bountiful, 996 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998). 
4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction before this court is proper pursuant to the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeals over the decisions of the trial court of the State of Utah. Const. Art. 8, § 
1; U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-l; Renn v. Utah State Bd of Pardons, 1995, 904 P.2d 677; 
U.C.A.1953,78-2a-L 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Appellant asserts that the service of the Notice of Claim by prior counsel for the 
Appellant was proper pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A. 1953 § 
63-30d-401. As such, Plaintiffs/Appellants maintain that the Trial Court improperly 
dismissed this suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants assert that the governmental entities waived their sovereign 
immunity, pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-10(10) (2003), and that the sovereign immunity of 
the State was not maintained due to an alleged "incarceration" of the decedent at the time 
of the incident. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Reviewed for correctness without any deference to the trial court's determination 
of law. Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25 
(Utah, 2003). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401. 
U.C.A. 1953, §63-30-11. 
U.C.A. 1953, § 63-30-10. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-11. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-l. 
Const. Art. 8, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 78-2a-l. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Utah Legislative changes to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act went into 
effect July 1,2004. 
Appellant's Notice of Claim was filed July 2, 2004, upon "City of St. George, 175 
East 200 North, St. George, Utah 84770," by Appellant's prior counsel, Braunberger, 
Boud & Draper, P.C. There was no "City Clerk" within the City of St. George that could 
be served. The City Recorder is Gay Cragun, who works for the City of St. George 
located at the same address. 
Suit was filed in the Fifth Judicial District Court and service of Summons and 
Complaint was effectuated March 4th, 2005, and was served upon Gay Cragun at the 
same address listed above. 
Defendants/Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss July 11th, 2005, alleging improper 
filing of the Notice of Claim by Plaintiffs/Appellants' prior counsel, Braunberger, Boud 
& Draper, P.C. After the filing of several responsive memorandum by both sides, the 
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Court issued the Defendants/Appellees9 Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice, of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellants5 lawsuit on January 18, 2006. The Defendants/Appellees' grounds 
for dismissal were (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to an improper filing of the 
Notice of Claim, and (2) because the governmental entities had not waived their 
sovereign immunity surrounding actions with regard to the "incarceration" of William 
Matthew Pace. 
From this order, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
William Matthew Pace was arrested March 13, 2004 for theft. William Matthew 
Pace was wearing a prosthetic back brace at the time of his arrest and was searched by 
the arresting officers. Such search failed to produce the 9mm pistol that Mr. Pace had, on 
his person, underneath the back brace. While in custody, prior to the filing of any formal 
charges, and before interrogations were completed, William Matthew Pace was excused 
to use the restroom and his restraints were removed. While in the restroom, William 
Matthew Pace produced the 9mm pistol and fatally shot himself. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs/Appellants' Notice of Claim was in strict compliance with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act pursuant to U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401 
2. Defendants/Appellees may not argue that the Notice of Claim was 
improperly served due to their failure to properly update their website with the 
Department of Commerce designating a City Clerk that is to receive service of the Notice 
of Claim. U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401(7). 
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3, Sovereign Immunity is waived in the foregoing matter due to the nature of 
the claims pursuant to U.C.A. 1953 § 63d-30d-301(3)(a)(4). 
4. Matthew William Pace was not "incarcerated" for the purposes of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and "detainment" is distinguishable from the precedent in 
Utah that has considered "confinement" to be post-conviction. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 
1159 (Utah 1996); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Ut. Ct pp. 1989); Lancaster v. Utah 
State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Filing of the Notice of Claim was strictly compliant with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act 
Dismissal of a case under the Governmental Immunity Act is reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the trial court's determination of law, as a complaint for 
failure to properly file a notice of claim is a conclusion of law. Gurule v. Salt Lake 
County, 2003, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25; Larson v. Park City 
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 339 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1998); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
12(b)(6). . 
First and foremost, the Utah Legislature has provided a procedural protective wall 
around its governmental entities in the form of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
This act represents one of only a few States that require strict compliance with the 
Notices of Claim filed against governmental entities. Johnson v. City of Bountiful, 1998, 
996 F.Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998). 
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Furthermore, the strictness with which strict compliance rule applies varies, and 
ambiguity in the statute allows for a relaxation of the strictness of the standard. Gurule v. 
Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25 (2003). In another 
example, a District Court was found to have subject matter jurisdiction over a teacher's 
claim under the Utah's Whistleblower Act against the superintendent in her official 
capacity, where the teacher served a notice of claim on the district but not on the 
superintendent. U.C.A. 1953, § 63-30-11(1). Youren v. Tintic School Dist, 343 F.3d 
1296 (10th Cir. 2003). 
The essence of the dismissal in the case at hand is that the Notice of Claim was not 
strictly compliant with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(A) (2003). This divested the 
Court of Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the foregoing matter, and as such, resulted in the 
non-prejudicial dismissal of suit, stating that the Utah and its political subdivisions had 
retained their governmental immunity under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (2003). 
The Order Granting Dismissal is bifurcated into two separate issues. The first is 
that the Notice of Claim was not filed properly pursuant to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, as required under U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401. The second interwoven 
issue is that as such, Utah did not waive her sovereign immunity with respect to an issue 
of incarceration. SeeU.CA. 1953 § 63-30-10(10). 
The service of the Notice of Claim necessary to establish Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction, was mailed to the address 175 East 200 North, St. George, UT 84770. The 
relevant Statute, which was in force at the time of the filing (which is the applicable 
version of the Statute pursuant to Goeble v. Salt Lake City & R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80 §§ 
0 
38-40, 104 P.3d 1185), requires the Notice of Claim to be "delivered by hand or by mail. 
. . to the office of... the city or town clerk." U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-40L 
Alternatively, if the City Recorder, Gay Cragun, (albeit not the Statutory "City 
Clerk" due to the City's failure to appoint such a position), is the proper individual upon 
whom the service of the Notice of Claim was to be directed and delivered, there is no 
statutory definition of "directed and delivered" within the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. The term "directed" ambiguously could refer to the name of the individual, the 
office, the name of the department, or the address of the individual prescribed under the 
Statute. By addressing the Notice of Claim to the proper address of the City Recorder, to 
which it was then delivered, the Notice of Claim was in fact "directed and delivered" 
pursuant to the Statute. The naming of the entity, "The City of St. George," on the 
Notice of Claim does not refute the proper direction of the postal delivery. Considering 
the failure of the City of St. George to designate a City Clerk, any addressed recipient at 
that address, including Gay Cragun, would only be a substitute for the non-existent 
position of City Clerk. The Statute itself states that it is the address to which Notices of 
Claim are "directed and delivered" under §§ 5(a)(iii). U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401. The 
statutory language is clear that the office or agent is only a designation upon the letter, 
but it is the addresses, not the recipients, which must be receiving proper direction and 
delivery. As such, Braunberger, Boud & Draper technically "directed and delivered" the 
Notice of Claim properly, as it is the address that requires proper designation, whereas 
the position of the person for whom the letter is either statutorily fungible, (or non-
existent in the City of St. George). There is no case law which supports or refutes the 
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address, versus the name, as being proper for the Notice of Claim under the Statute to be 
satisfied as "directed and delivered." 
The City of St. George had not yet updated their file with the Department of 
Commerce properly designating the Statutory individual to receive a Notice of Claim. 
Furthermore, they still have not updated the file to designate a proper City Clerk upon 
whom service could be proper under §§(3)(b)(a). The legislation had changed only the 
day before, and Defense has yet to provide evidence to the contrary. As such, if the 
dispute is documentary in nature, the matter must proceed to trial to determine the merits 
of the dispute after only a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Kamdar & Co. v. 
Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). As a result of the neglect by the City of 
St. George in designating the proper recipient, the language of Shafer is controlling, 
stating that, "in the absence of specific delineation by the statutory recipient of the notice, 
the notice may be properly served upon any of the addresses through which service could 
be delivered." Shafer v. State, 79 P.3d 936 (Utah 2003). 
II. Defendants may not argue that Notice of Claim was improperly served due to 
their failure to properly update the website with the Department of 
Commerce designating a City Clerk that is to receive service of the Notice of 
Claim, U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-40U7). 
At the time of the service of the Notice of Claim, the City of St. George had no 
City Clerk. There is still no one with that title within the City of St. George pursuant to 
the statement of Helen Wray, a receptionist with the City of St. George as of June 27, 
2006. There was a City recorder, Gay Cragun, upon whom Appellant properly served the 
Complaint and Summons, and her address is the same as the address to which the Notice 
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of Claim was sent, 175 East 200 North, St. George, UT 84770. The suit was against the 
City of St. George, who has not properly designated a City Clerk who could lawfully 
receive service of the Notice of Claim pursuant to the Statute. The Amendment noted by 
Defendants/Appellees changing the Statute requiring service upon the City Clerk was 
enacted within 1 week of the service of the Notice of Claim by Plaintiffs/Appellants' 
prior counsel, Braunberger, Boud & Draper. The City failed to designate the proper 
individual to receive Notice of Claim which statutorily warrants the preclusion of their 
current assertion that the Notice was not properly served. The Defendants/Appellees 
failed to update the statement required under §§7. That provision reads, "(7) A 
governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds 
that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by 
the governmental entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection 
(5)." U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-401(7). 
The twofold legislative motivation in enacting the standards of Notice of Claim 
requirements is highlighted in Busch v. Salt Lake Intern. Airport, 921 P.2d 470 (Utah 
1996). Those motives are, first, a prerogative granted to public authorities allowing "an 
opportunity to investigate, settle, or deny a claim without expending public revenue for 
costly and unnecessary litigation." Secondly, the legislation "provides an opportunity to 
those vested with authority to remedy a dangerous condition so that further damage or 
injury can be avoided." 
In light of the foregoing, how can it possibly be conceived that the legislative 
intent, although requiring strict compliance, was not met? In considering the roots of 
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strict compliance with Notice of Claim requirements, the circumstances of serving the 
Notice of Claim of this case are in direct alignment with what the Utah legislature 
intended to be effectuated through a Notice of Claim. In one of the first cases to address 
the issue, service upon the mayor of the city with notice of an assignment of money 
payable by the city to the assignor constituted notice to the city and was binding upon it. 
Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40, 440 P.2d 15 (1968). U.C.A.1953, 10-6-3, 10-6-5, 10-
6-9, 10-6-23, 10-6-24, 10-7-77, 10-10-61. 
In the case at bar, ample notice was given, in strict compliance with the Statutory 
parameter abiding by the requirements that have become the storm shelter for 
governmental agencies wishing to avoid lawful service. Through failure to update the 
system, they have claimed the true authorized recipient did not receive a proper Notice of 
Claim, and have delayed the remedy of a properly presented Plaintiff for over a year. It 
is the legislature's ambiguity that has presented the confusion in what "directed and 
delivered" to means, whether a naming of the individual and office is necessary, or 
whether a proper address gives sufficient direction for delivery. Such an ambiguity 
should be interpreted to favor legislative intent, which has already been satisfied in the 
foregoing instance, and mandates a relaxation of the strict compliance standards. Gurule 
v. Salt Lake County, 69 P.3d 1287, 474 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2003 UT 25 (2003). 
III. Sovereign Immunity is waived in the foregoing matter due to the nature of 
the claims pursuant to U.CA. 1953 § 63d-30d-301(3)(a¥4). 
The Court has pointed to the government's failure to waive its sovereign immunity 
in the foregoing matter due to the "incarceration" of the decedent. Assuming arguendo 
n 
that the Notice of Claim was properly served, it is the nature of the claim that waives 
sovereign immunity of the governmental entity. Defendants/Appellees state that 'the 
is is enti * nisleading, as 
the website only lists a "City Recorder" win* mpliant 
U.G.I.A. requirements.. The City still has not designated .. _.iy Clerk upon whom service 
could be proper under the Statute I he legislation had changed within the last week prior 
to the filing 
of St. George had not as yet updated the listing with the Utah Department of Commerce. 
Furthermore, "(Ommumty from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to 
anj Ini|iimi' - ' nej-'li^ cul iu/l 01 omission oi an employee committed 
within the scope oi employment/' U.C.A. I OS I {', 63d-30d-301(3)(a)(4). 
Defendants/Appellees' claims that immunity b retained because client w as 
"incarcerated' are inaccurate, as our client was not yet formally arraigned, convicted, or 
placed in a detention facility 
employee, he was merely a pre-trial detainee incarcerated for the purposes of 
Madsen v State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). The Statute is not contemplating pre-trial 
detaintiictil but i milum posl- it iih m mif \ onfinem -.enimeniai immunity is not 
waived in connection with "(j) the incarceration of any person in any slalc prison, i ,»iiii'i ; 
or city jail, or other place of legal confinement." Id. at (5)(j). Were the interpretation of 
1he Defendants to be upheld, governmental actors could arbitrarily detain any citizen, on 
meritless grounds, and abuse 
available would be the cumbersome venue of sec. 1983 claims. It could not have been 
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the legislative intent of the U.G.I A. to foreclose all state claims for recovery by Plaintiffs 
injured by the government before charges have even been filed.( For a more complete 
rendition of the structure of civil claims against governmental entities, see Civil Actions 
Against State and Local Government § 3:16, Police and Fire Protection; Civil Actions 
Against State and Local Government § 3:17, Operation of Prisons.) 
IV. The Decedent was not "incarcerated" for the purposes of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and "detainment" is distinguishable from 
the precedent in Utah that has considered "confinement" to be post-
conviction. 
Incarceration, as it has been considered in every case considered within the 
annotations of the pertinent statute, has only extended to those who have been convicted 
and sentenced. See U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-301 Annotations. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 
1159 (Utah 1996); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); Lancaster v. Utah 
State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987), Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 
(1987); Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968). The immunity for a 
governmental entity only extends insomuch as the claim is for "recovery for injury 
arising out of incarceration of person in state prison or other place of legal confinement." 
U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30d-301. Legal confinement contemplates a post-conviction akin to 
state prison under the statutory language. It does not mention places of pre-trial 
detention, nor has any Utah case considered pre-trial detention as an extension of the 
already-broad immunity held by governmental entities. 
The question on the horizon of this Appeal of whether or not the action by the 
employees of the Defendants/Appellees were discretionary such that the governmental 
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immunity could properly be invoked. To ascertain whether policy-making decision by 
governmental entity was "discrelionarx and Unis not subject to governmental immunity, 
lllliir I i mil ni i i i l iiiir.iili i "i \ In Ih i in in I HIM I|M i basit p n I'nimrnliil pn lu\ |'ii i^iimr< nr 
objectives, and whether the acts or omissions are essential to a realization of policy. 
Also, it must be determined whether the act or omission required the exercise of basic 
(Mi»In "i I ' laltiali i i i i in Il i \\n Mi i(. and nltdl iet go\enmienl iij-'cnt) iiiiHiilk eil possessed 
required the constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and diity to negligently perform 
the search on William Matthev ~ *<. \ ,1953, 63-30-10(1). Adamsoi - *. <'n .;/ 
Provo, 819 F.Supp - L (It must also be remembered that the determination 
• 3f whether a go \ • • - - t , MKII (II.I1 rnlil ' is 
entitled to governmental immunity, _ ~ fact-intensive inquin that, b> its very nature, is 
not particularly amenable to summary judgment. n C A.1953, 63-30-10(1). Sandberg v. 
I elmuin it'iisi , I ,i \pp 
272 (2003)). However, these are decisions that are not being cm tiered within the scope 
of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Notir i 
delivered the proper address as needed for strict compliance. Furthermore, 
Defendants/Appellees failed to comply with the Department of Commerce update as 
I at notice w as improperly served. 
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Defendants/Appellees also waived their sovereign immunity due to the nature of 
the claims against them, and due to the fact that decedent was not "incarcerated" for the 
purposes of the U.G.I. A. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Courts Dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction should be REVERSED. 
DATED this 3rd day of July 2006. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Matthew T. Graff, Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COTT?T 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
KRISTIE PACE individually and for and on ) 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM ) 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF THE I ST. GEORGE DEFENDANTS' 
ESTATE, COMBINED MOTION TO DISMISS 
* ND MEMORAND UM IN SUPPOR T 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE D E P A R T M J -
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, JOHN DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants. 
reiciivfo] 
.IUI 1 * 2005 | 
Case No. 050500_-> * 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
This case arises out of the suicide of William Matthew Pace on March 13, 2004, after 
being arrested for theft. While at the St. George Police Department-JaiL Pace asked to go 
to the bathroom. When Pace's handcuffs were removed he pulled a pistol from beneath a 
back brace he was wearing and killed himself. Plaintiffs' have sued St. George City Police 
Department and the City of St. George. Utah (collectively "St George Defendants**), for 
negligence based on the alleged failure of the arresting officers to properly search Pace and 
discover the pistol with which he killed himself. 
Plaintiffs, however, failed to serve a Notice of Claim in accordance with the 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). thereby depriving this 
Court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Additionally, the UGIA does not waive 
sovereign immunity for injury arising out of the incarceration of any person and/or an 
inadequate or negligent inspection. Wherefore, pursuant to Utah R Civ P 12(b)(1) and 
12(b)(6), the UGIA and the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. St George Defendants hereby 
move to dismiss Plaintiffs'1 Complaint with prejudice. St. George Defendants' Memorandum 
in Support is set forth below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts the Court needs to rule upon the pending Motion are as follows: 
1. OnMarch 13,2004, William Matthew Pace was arrested fortheft (Complaint 
? 
2. While at the St. George Police Department ail Pace stated that he needed to 
use the restroom. Officers removed the handcuffs from Pacers right wrist and escorted him 
Lw Llit; restroom L~ . * »..., ^ 
3. I • • • 9m nil Gloc] :pi stol and si lot 1 :i imse] f in the head 
{Id. at ffij 2G-26). 
1 The pistol Pace used to kill himself was hidden beneath a back brace he was 
wearing ai me iimi-. i ^.i^iris allege thai :> ueorgc C iiv ol hcers were negligent in failing 
:•'".. - ' . M . . - >-u K -
 : ! •• -weapon. (Matffi[20-26). 
5. On July 2, 20043 Plaintiffs' served a Notice of Claim under the C/GZ4. 
Plaintiffs did not, however, serve that Notice of Claim upon the St. George, Utah City 
Recorder as required by Utah Code Ann. K CO-30-1 l(3)(b)(iiVM ] A copy of thai Notice of 
Clai / i is atta ched hereto as Exh ibit A • • -
PLAINTIFFS FAILURE TO PROPERLY SERVE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE UGIA DEPRIVES THIS COURT OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION 
LiA court in JS; have subject matter jui isdiction to have power and authority to decide 
]The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to 38 (1997 & Supp. 2003), was 
repealed effective July 1. 2004, and replaced with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-
30d-101 to 904 (2004). The prior act, in effect during 2003, applies to this action. 
3 
a controversy. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed/' Burns 
Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Insurance Co., 851 P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah App. 1993). Utah 
law requires strict compliance with the Notice of Claim provision of the UGIA. See Bischel 
v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275, 279 (Utah App. 1995). More importantly, the burden of 
establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Basso v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). 
As stated mNielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1994), a Plaintiffs 
"failure to comply with the Notice requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore compliance with the Act 
is a precondition to maintaining an action." Simply put, the UGIA provides that a claim 
against a political subdivision of the State of Utah, such as St. George Defendants, "is 
barred unless Notice of Claim is filed with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim arises " Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13. See 
also Busch v. Salt Lake International Airport, 921 P.2d 470,471 (Utah 1996); Scarborough 
v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975)Ccwe have consistently held that 
where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance with this requirement is a 
condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit"). 
The UGIA specifies the form in which the claim must be presented and to whom the 
4 
claim must be delivered. CwAny person having a claim for injurs7 against a governmental 
entity . . . shall file a written Notice of Claim with the entity before maintaining an action.5* 
{Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2)) (emphasis added). More importantly, however, the UGIA 
required that "[t]he Notice of Claim [against a city] shall be . . . directed and delivered to 
the City7 or Town Recorder " Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(A) (emphasis 
added).2 
As the Court will note from Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim, they did not serve the St. 
George City' ''Recorder* with their Notice of Claim and that is fatal to this action because the 
most recent Utah case law mandates strict compliance with this Notice requirement even if 
the governmental entity has the actual Notice of Claim. In Green v. Utah Transit Authority, 
201 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156 (Utah 2001), for example, a passenger sued UTA to recover for 
injuries while boarding a bus. The Plaintiff in that action delivered her Notice of Claim to 
UTA's claim adjustor. However, under the UGIA, & Notice of Claim must be directed and 
delivered to UTA's President or Secretary of the Board. The Green Court noted that the 
actual knowledge of the existence of the claim by a governmental entity does not excuse a 
claimants strict compliance with the requirements of the UGIA. Id. at 1159. Although the 
'When used in a statute, the word "shall" is a word of command and one which must be given a compulsory 
meaning; as denoting obligation. BlacksLcnvDiciionaiy, 3375 (6th Ed. 1990). 
5 
UTA had actual knowledge of the claim in Green* the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
Plaintiff had failed to strictly comply with the UGIA notice requirements and that deprived 
the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. See also Brown v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 40 P.3d 638 (Utah 2002)(holding that mailing of a Notice of Claim to 
UTA. rather than to UTA's governing board, was insufficient to comply with the statutory 
notice requirement); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002)(holdingthe failure to 
strictly comply with the UGIA*s notice requirement deprives the District Court of 
jurisdiction). Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim having been similarly unserved, this Court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction and their Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. 
ST, GEORGE DEFENDANTS AJRE ALSO IMMUNE FROM SUIT 
UNDER THE UGIA 
The UGIA defines the extent to which the State of Utah, its political subdivisions and 
employees3 are immune from suit. The UGIA initially provides that "all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function.^4 Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3-(l). The UGIA then waives this 
"Immunity is extended to government employees, such as the individual Defendants pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-4(3) and (4). 
4 
"Governmental Function" means any act failure to act operation, function, or 
undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act, 
operation, function, or undertaking is a characterized as governmental, proprietary, 
a core governmental function, unique to government undertaken in a dual capacity, 
6 
general immunity for fc%suit[s]... for injury7 proximately caused by a negligent act or omission 
of an employee committed within the scope of emplo3;ment^ Id. § 63-30-10. But the UGIA 
then contains exceptions to the foregoing waiver. See id. § 63-30-10(1) to (19). 
Specifically, sovereign immunity is retained when the suit is for negligently caused 
injury arising out of the incarceration of any person. See id. § 63-30-10(10). Consequently, 
the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in that the claims asserted therein arise out 
of the incarceration of William Matthew Pace. In Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978), 
the wife and daughter of a prison inmate brought a wrongful death action after the inmate 
died while incarcerated. See id. The decedent's survivors in Madsen alleged that his death 
was the result of medical mistreatment and neglect, including 'wthat the defendant's agents 
failed and neglected to examine Madsen or to summon competent medical help to his aid. 
after being infomied by other inmates that he was having difficulty breathing after the 
surgery." Id. The Utah Supreme Court, relying on Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(10), 
dismissed Plaintiffs' claim, stating: 
The plain meaning of the section reflects a legislative intent to 
retain sovereign immunity for any injuries occurring while the 
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function, or could be 
performed by private enterprise or private persons. 
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-2(4)(a). All of the acts of Washington County Defendants alleged in the Complaint clearly 
fit within this broad definition of governmental function. 
7 
incarcerated person is in prison and under the control of the 
State. Since this injury occurred while [the decedent] was under 
the control of prison officials, the governmental entities... are 
. . . immune from liability. 
Madsen, 5^3?2d at 93. 
The UGIA also provides that immunity is not waived for injuries caused as a result of 
"making an inadequate or negligent inspection . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) 
(emphasis added). This provision of the UGIA would likewise barr Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint based upon the sovereign 
immunity retained under the UGIA. See Oliver v. Woods, 21 F. Supp.2d 1325, 1332 (D.Utah 
1998) (dismissing "state law claims [that were] barred by Urah 's Governmental Immunity 
Acf\ overruled on other grounds, 209 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2000).5 
DATED this 11th day of July, 2005. 
SU1TTER AXLAND 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
5A Motion to Dismiss based on sovereign immunity is treated as a Motion to Dismiss for the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See Neiberger v. Hawkins. 70 F.Supp.fd 1177. 1181 (D.Colo. 1999). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 11th day of July. 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ST. GEORGE DEFENDANTS' COMBINED MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT to be served via, first class United States mail postage 
prepaid, upon the following: 
Matthew T. Graff. Esq. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
1957 West Royal Hunte Drive, Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
G/4872\MOT)OK TO DISMISS wpd 
9 
BRAUNBERGER, BOUD & DRAPER, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
765 East 9000 South, Suiie A-l 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Phone (801) 562-3200 Of Counsel 
Fax (801) 562-5250 Richard I. Ashton 
Pnactive] 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
July 2, 2004 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND REGULAR MAIL 
St. George Police Department 
200 East 265 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City of St. George 
175 East 200 North 
St, George, Utah 84770 
MayoT Daniel McArthur 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member - Suzanne Allen 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Larry Gardner 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Rodney Orton 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Robert Whatcott 
175 East 200 North 
St George.. Utah 84770 
Re; Our Client: Kristy Pace, widow to Matthew Pace 
1 
Wayne H. Braunberger 
James R, Boud 
Tad D. Draper 
Troy K. Walker 
EXHIBIT A 
Date of Incident: March 13,2004 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter shall serve as Notice of Claim upon the City of St. George pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann, § 63-30-1 et. seq. Further, governmental immunity is deemed waived in this matter. 
SECTION I 
Statement of Facts 
On March 13, 2004, an officer at the St. George Police Department, believed to be 
Officer Collard arranged for Matthew Pace to come into the police department for an interview 
regarding an alleged theft. At the time of the inteno gallon, the police department performed a 
pat down search on Matt Pace to check for weapons and presumably other potentially dangerous 
objects. It is also believed that Mr. Pace again underwent a second pat down search while in 
police custody. Subsequent to these searches, Mr. Pace asked to use the restroom. Accordingly, 
rwo St. George police officers escorted Mr. Pace to the restroom and stood, in presence, 
approximately 12 feet away while he was in the restroom facilities. At this time, he pulled a 
hand gun from his belt region and shot himself in the head. Mr, Pace died immediately, Mr. 
Pace was not searched with a magnetometer. 
SECTION n 
Nature of the Claim 
This claim is against the City of St. George, and more particularly the St. George Police 
Department for the wrongful death of William Matthew Pace, who. while under worry and duress 
while being in police custody, was not properly searched either manually, or through the use of a 
magnetometer for a dangerous weapon. The negligence of improperly searching and securing the 
safety of Mr. Pace directly resulted in his death, and the endangerment of other individuals in the 
police facility. The claim is brought by and through Kristy Pace, Mr, Pace's wife, and personal 
representative to his estate, both in her individual and personal representative capacity* The 
claim is asserted under one or more of the provisions of Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
SECTION m 
Injuries and Damages Sustained 
The injuries are, loss of support, companionship, society and other losses and injuries 
pertaining to a wrongful death action on behalf of Kristy Pace and the heirs of Matthew Pace. 
The compensable loss and damages resulting from the wrongful acts of the St, George Police 
Department include, but are not limited to the necessary and reasonable cost and loss associated 
with Mr, Pace's wrongful death, including funeral expenses and the economic loss, both present 
and future, The full value of this has not currently been deteimined, but would include a 
? 
calculation for present and funire wage loss as well as general damages for pain, suffering, loss 
of society and companionship, which is not currently known, but will be established upon further 
discovery and investigation. 
SECTION IV 
Acknowledgment 
This Notice of Claim is intended to comply with the provisions set forth in Utah Code 
Arm. § 63-30-12 et seq, The undersigned is a duly authorized attorney of the Claimants by 
written agreement. 
3 
L/rJ'yf— 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF (8605) 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1957 W. Royal Hunte Dr., Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-5115 
FAX: (435) 586-5118 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTIE PACE individually and for and on 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF 
THE ESTATE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 050500378 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Oral Argument Requested 
FACTS 
Decedent was arrested March 13, 2004 for theft. Decedent was wearing a prosthetic 
back brace at the time of the arrest and was searched by the arresting officers. Such search 
failed to produce the 9mm pistol that Decedent had on his person under the back brace. As a 
result, while in custody, after the Decedent went to use the restroom and his restraints were 
removed, Decedent produced the handgun and fatally shot himself. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants have argued that the Notice of Claim requirement of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act require the dismissal of this suit. However, as is supported in 
this memorandum by affidavit, notice was sufficient upon the individuals or offices allowed by 
U.C.A. 63-30-11 and the precedence within this state. As such, the service rendered, and 
sworn to by affidavit, was indeed upon the "governing body" as required by the UGIA and is 
therefore sufficient, satisfying Rule 4 of the U.R.C.P., for service upon a governmental body. 
In Wills v. Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority, 2003 Ut 45, 79 P.3d 934 (Utah 
2003), it was determined that mere service upon one of the offices of the Attorney General 
would suffice. In the absence of specific delineation by the statutory recipient of the notice, 
the notice may be properly served upon any of the addresses through which service could be 
delivered. Shafer v. State, 79 P.3d 936 (Utah 2003). It is not the responsibility of the 
Plaintiff to single out one of several addresses upon which Notice of Claim can be served if 
the Defendant has not taken affirmative steps to clarify the address of the individual to be 
served. Id. Defendant has taken no such affirmative steps in this instance, and as such, 
service was proper upon the address reasonably calculated to reach the statutory recipient of 
the notice. 
2 
Strict compliance with the Notice of Claim provisions of the statute is not necessary in 
instances where the agency served could reasonably be considered an uagency concerned" with 
the purposes of the statute. Brittain v. State by & Through Utah Dep 't of Employment Sec., 
882 P.2d 666, 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1994). In that case, service was proper 
even upon the agency that investigated or settled the claims (Department of Risk Management) 
against the proper party at fault (Department of Employment Security). 
It is further worth noting as a policy measure that the vast majority of the courts favor 
substantial compliance as the standard, and recent Utah decisions are consonant with such 
holdings as illustrated. See also Feinberg v. New Jersey Dept. ofEnvtl. Protection, 137 NJ 
126, 644 A2d 593, 45 ALR5th 837 (1994); Indiana State Highway Comm. v. Morris, 528 
NE2d 468 (Ind. 1988); and within the 10th Circuit, Ruffin v. Oklahoma Dep't of Human Servs. 
852 P.2d 793 (Okla. App. 1993); Woodrow v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 861 P.2d 1009 
(Okla. App. 1993), which only required service upon the offending agency. In Lafitte v. State 
Highway Dep't.. 885 P.2d 338, (Colo. App. 1994) the court excused a plaintiffs failure to serve 
claim notice upon the Attorney General, since recent amendments to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-
109 (1988) authorized substantial compliance with the claim-notice requirements. In that 
holding, only a good faith effort to serve the Attorney General was necessary. Notably, Utah 
courts have already definitively expressed the standard regarding Utah Transit Authority suits to 
regard the Notice of Claim as only requiring substantial compliance. Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 
618 P.2d 480 (Utah, 1980). 
Defendants cite heavily to Busch v. Salt Lake Intern, Airport, 921 P.2d 470 (Utah 
3 
App.,1996). That case in fact outlines the reasoning behind the Notice of Claim requirements. 
"The Governmental Immunity Act serves two important purposes. First, it affords the 
responsible public authorities an opportunity to investigate, settle, or deny a claim 
without expending public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation. Brittain, 882 
P.2d at 67 L Also, compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act provides an 
opportunity to those vested with authority to remedy a dangerous condition so that 
further damage or injury can be avoided. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 
(Utah 1977)." Busch at 472. 
Such legislative intent has been more than satisfied in the forgoing claim. The Defendants' 
have been given ample time for investigating, settling, or denying the claim at hand, and have 
instead again delayed any substantive progression in this matter. A constructive knowledge 
of the incident has also been afforded to all those vested with authority to prevent this sort of 
tragedy from happening in the future. The purpose of the Notice of Claim act has therefore 
been completely satisfied. 
Defendants were properly served all initial documents on this matter. Please see the 
Affidavit of Jason Neal (Exhibit A), attached, and copies of Affidavits of Service and 
Delivery regarding the service of all initial pleadings on this matter (Exhibit B). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' service was strictly compliant with the provisions of the UGIA. If, 
however, only substantial compliance is found, the notice necessary to satisfy the 
legislative intent of the Notice provision of the act was satisfied, and Utah case law 
validates the service that was effectuated in this matter. In light of the foregoing, we 
respectfully request that this Court deny the Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
4 
si/to 
DATED this y^-fc day of July, 2005. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
MATTHEW T.GI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
5 
CERTIFICATE OF MATLING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed by first class 
mail, postage fully prepaid on this ^ / ? P - day of July, 2005, to the following: 
Shawn M. Guzman 
St. George City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, UT 84770 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Suitter Axland, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suitte 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paralegal / " / U 
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Exhibit A 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF (8605) 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1957 West Royal Hunte Drive 
Suite 200 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-5115 
Facsimile: (435)586-5118 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTIE PACE individually and for and 
on behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM j 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF 
THE ESTATE 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10 
[ Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JASON NEAL 
CaseNo.050500378 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Jason Neal, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is a citizen of St. George, Utah. 
That he is over the age of eighteen. 
That he is employed by the law firm of Matthew T. Graff & Associates. 
That one of his duties as an employee is to act as a civil process server when 
required. 
That on March 3rf, 2005 he contacted the St. George City Offices to inquire as to 
the name of the individual that accepts service for all legal actions against St. 
George City. 
That the name given to him was Gay Cragun. 
That on March 3rd, 2005, he did serve Gay Cragun with a Complaint, Summons 
and Subpoena Duces Tecum on the matter of Pace v. St. George City Police 
Department, City of St. George, and John Does 1 through 10, known as Case No. 
050500378 in the Fifth Judicial District of Washington County. 
That Gay Cragun came out of her office into the hallway inside the St. George 
City Offices, and did in fact accept service of the Complaint, Summons, and 
Subpoena Duces Tecum in this matter, known as Case No. 050500378 in the Fifth 
Judicial District of Washington County. 
That he then went across the street to the St. George City Police Department and 
attempted to serve the Complaint, Summons, and Subpoena Duces Tecum on the 
matter known as Case No. 050500378 to the receptionist in the reception area. 
That the receptionist stated that someone in management would need to address 
this issue. The Receptionist went into the back office area and returned with a 
man. 
That this male employee, representing the St. George City Police Department 
refused to accept service of the documents related to Case No. 050500378. 
That this employee of the St. George City Police Department then told Jason Neal 
that the person who actually accepts service for the St. George Police Department 
is Gay Cragun. 
That he then inquired as to the reason for this. 
14. That he was then told that because the St. George City Police Department is 
operated and governed by the City of St. George entity, that St. George City must 
accept service of all legal documents. 
15. That, after this he traveled to his place of employment at Matthew T. Graff & 
Associates, which is located in Cedar City, Utah. 
16. That he reported the refusal of service to Matthew T. Graff, Plaintiffs' attorney on 
this matter. 
17. That after making a phone call to the City of St. George, it was confirmed by a 
representative of the City of St. George that they are in fact supposed to accept 
service for the St. George City Police Department. 
18. That on May 4th, 2005, he returned to the St. George City Offices. 
19. That he asked the receptionist to request that Gay Cragun accept service of 
documents. 
20. That Gay Cragun was paged. 
21. That Gay Cragun did not appear for at least ten minutes. 
22. That Gay Cragun did appear in the hallway and was visibly angry. 
23. That Gay Cragun inquired as to why she was being served a duplicate set of 
documents. 
24. That he explained the refusal of service he encountered at the St. George City 
Police Department and the subsequent confirmation that she was to accept service 
for the St. George City Police Department. 
25. That Gay Cragun took the documents from Jason Neal and stated "I guess it's me 
then." 
26. That Gay Cragun was properly served, acting as a representative for the City of 
St. George, which governs and operates the St. George City Police Department. 
FURTHER AFFIANTS SAITH NOT. 
Dated this jg*7 day of July, 2005. 
E. JASON NEA 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF IRON ) . 
I hereby testify that E. JASON NEAL appeared before me this Ul aay of 
July, 2005 and affixed his signature to this Affidavit and deposed and swore that the 
items contained herein were true and accurate. 
My Commission Expires: 
M 
Exhibit B 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
Having been duly sworn, I hereby depose and say that I am a resident of the State, and a Citizen 
of the United States, that I am over the age of 21 years, am not a party to or interested in any action being 
taken. That at the time of service I did endorse upon the copies left for the person being served, the date 
and my name thereto. 
I served: ^ ^ r / T 6 ^ y - > ? 
Located at: /?<T B. *Zm> A / 
On the: ^ day of 
9<m 
AJ 2005. 
At the hour of: fry /n X-.m. 
Who is the: (X) Defendant ( ) Plaintiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness 
( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
DOCUMENT(S) SERVED: (^) Subpoena Duces Tecum 
MANNER OF SERVICE: ( ^ ) Personally served ( ) At the dwelling, house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing. 
( ) By delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive process 
( ) By posting in a conspicuous manner (Upon the main entry point) 
COMMENTS: 
CLIENT INFORMATION: 
Dated this:
 VQ day of March, 2005. 
Process Server^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME THIS: ^ day of 
Service Fees $; 
***% Stacy UeNeai 
*\ 1957 W ftoyafrtante Dr., Sie. 2001 
°~ Cedar CKy, Utah 84720 
My Cormmstioii Expires 
^ -v.. -.,jr ABgusMS.2008 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
of the SffiSSS llToyl^JTZT ^ thaIl am 3 reSWent ° f thC *** and a <*" 
taken. That at the ime of se^vicTi dM Z£ * lu™ " 0 t a p a i t y t 0 o r i n t e r e s t e d i n any ac«°« bei, 
and my name thereto * e n d 0 F S e U p ° n t h e C0P ies ,ef t f o r t h e Pe™>» being served, the da 
1 S C m d :
 - % - ^ % ^ _ _ 
2 u h h e e h ^ r d a y o f - ^ ^ - .2005-
At the hour of: /o.in jt*m 
Who is the: (X) Defendant ( ) Pontiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness 
( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
DOCUMENTS) SERVED: ( *) Summons and Compl 
aint 
COMMENTS-
CLIENT TNPriPA^ ATTf>N 
Dated this: 3 - ^ day of March, 2005. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE & THIS: _ ^ _
 d a y 9tj4j^£ 2 m . 
Service Fees 
4 'i/ti'iCii'yMv^MtWH^^i^j^>^ AftM*^ 
Stacy LM Nil! 
11957 W ftytfHimto Dr., SU. 20$^ 
Cwlar City. UUh 14720 
My ttomiwsilw Expire* 
5 XotiJ/ Stale of Utah -t 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
Having been duly sworn, I hereby depose and say that I am a resident of the State, and a Citizen 
of the United States, that I am over the age of 21 years, am not a party to or interested in any action being 
taken. That at the time of service I did endorse upon the copies left for the person being served, the date 
and my name thereto. 
I served: @*% £ ^^f •juun 
Located at; / 7 £ £., Ztfo A / . 
:f^  day of ffltn-J , 2005. On the 
At the hour of: ]$: c/p _A>m. 
Who is the: (/Q Defendant ( ) Plaintiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness 
( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
DOCUMENTS SERVED: (/0) Summons and Complaint 
MANNER OF SERVICE: (Vj) Personally served ( ) At the dwelling, house or usual place of 
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing. 
( ) By delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive process 
( ) By posting in a conspicuous manner (Upon the main entry point) 
COMMENTS: 
CLIENT INFORMATION: 
Dated this: Jfjf^ day of March, 2005. 
Process Servei 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME THIS: 
Service Fees $: 
2005. 
'Wc 
t StacyleeFteal j 
n 1957 W RoyalHunte Dr., Stc. 200J 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
*7C©mmls$k> " 
A<MUSt15.200< 
^ r , m * . StateofUah -
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
of the i&JSltS I^^ttfe^? t h a !* a m a r e s i d e n t «f *e State, and a CitL 
taken. That at the time of service I ZJntLelyears'am n o t a P*rty to or interested in any action be 
and my „a m e thereto. d e n d 0 r S e U p o n t h e C0Pies left for the person being served, the d 
I served: QAXJ PI~ 
^x*** at: IIG g. ^ A / 
On the: ^ ^ day of [Murd) , 2005. 
At the hour of: p.^f) Jr_.m. 
Who is the: (X) Defendant ( ) Plaintiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness 
( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
D Q a f f i f f i Jffi§^EBVEB: (X) Subpoena Duces Tecum 
MANNER OF SFftv^p.
 f V / , p o _ 
~ S K S = * r ^ ^ «^ e dweUin8, house or usuaI p,ace 
COMMENTS. 
CLIENT INFQRMATfnN. 
Dated this: H day of March, 2005. 
focess Serv 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFOREME THIS: 
Service Fees $: 
Jesse C. Trentadue (#4961) 
Michael W. Homer (#1535) 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7355 
Shawn M Guzman (#7392) 
ST. GEORGE CITY ATTORNEY 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 634-5000 
Facsimile: (435) 674-4260 
Attorneys for City of St. George, Utah and St. George City Police Dept. 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTEE PACE individually and for and on 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEJRS OF THE 
ESTATE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, JOHN DOES 1 
through 10, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
) SUPPORT OF ST. GEORGE 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISMISS 
) Case No. 050500378 
) Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
St. George Defendants hereby submit, through counsel, this Reply Memorandum in 
I RECEIVED 
AUG 1 1 7f)05 
Support of St George Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. 
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Plaintiffs directed and delivered their Notice of Claim by certified and regular mail
 A 
to St. George Police Department, City of St. George, the Mayor of St. George City, and the 
City Council members of St. George City. Plaintiffs did not direct or deliver their Notice of 
Claim to the St. George City Recorder or the St. George City Clerk.1 St. George Defendants 
demonstrated in their opening Memorandum that the Plaintiffs were required to "direct and 
deliver to . . . the city or town recorder" their written Notice of Claim. {Memo, in Support 
of Mot to Dismiss, pp. 3-6.) St. George Defendants further demonstrated that because strict 
compliance with the Notice of Claim provisions i s required under Utah 1 aw P laintiffs5 
Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. {See id.) Plaintiffs respond by arguing that (1) 
"[i]n the absence of specific delineation by the statutory recipient of the notice, the notice 
maybe properly served upon any of the addresses through which service could be delivered"; 
1
 The relevant provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in effect at the time of the alleged injury in 
this case was Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii)(A) (Supp. 2003), requiring that the Notice of Claim be "directed and 
delivered to . . . the c i ty . . . recorder" of St. George City. The relevant provision of the Governmental Immunity Act of 
Utah in effect at the time Plaintiffs mailed their Notice of Claims* Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-4Gl(3)(b)(ii)(A) (2004), 
requiring that the Notice of Claim be "directed and delivered by hand or by ma i l . . . to the office of. . . the city or town 
clerk" of St. George City. Regardless of the applicable provisions, because Plaintiffs failed to direct or deliver their 
Notice of Claim to the City Recorder or the City Clerk, the outcome is the same. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. 
Co., 2004 UT 80, ffi[ 38-40, 104 P.3d 1185 (holding that notice of claim requirements in effect at the time of giving 
notice are controlling). 
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(2) "[s]trict compliance with the Notice of Claim provisions of the statute is not necessary 
in instances where the agency could reasonably be considered an 'agency concerned5 with 
the purposes of the statute"; (3) other jurisdictions do not require strict compliance with their 
notice of claim provisions; and (4) Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim was sufficient to meet the 
policy considerations behind Notice of Claim requirements. {See Memo, in Opp. to 
Defendants' Mot to Dismiss, pp. 2-4.) Plaintiffs' arguments are unavailing. 
Plaintiffs' first assertion is that if it is unclear what location to send a Notice of Claim 
to, the Notice may be sent to any address associated with the designated statutory recipient. 
In support of this argument, Plaintiffs rightly cited companion cases Wills v. Heber Valley 
Historic Railroad Authority, 2003 UT 45, 19 P.3d 934, and Shafer v. State, 19 P.3d 936 
(Utah 2003), which each focused upon the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's "silen[ce] 
. . . on the matter of where a notice of claim must be directed and delivered." Wills, 2003 UT 
45 at Tf 4 (emphasis in original); see also Shafer, 79 P.3d at 937. Plaintiffs' reliance on Wills 
and Shafer is, however, inapposite here because (1) the ACT stated to whom the Notice of 
Claim was to be sent and (2) the deficiency with Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim is not with the 
address to which it was sent. Rather, the Notice of Claim is deficient because it was not 
"directed" to the St. George City Recorder or Clerk as required by the Act, and for this reason 
the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiffs' s econd a ssertion - that " [sjtrict c ompliance w ith the Notice of Claim 
3 
provisions of the statute is not necessary in instances where the agency could reasonably be 
considered an 'agency concerned5 with the purposes of the statute" — is based solely on 
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, Brittain dealt with a claim 
against the State of Utah, for which the notice requirements are different than as against a 
city. See id. at 669-70. More importantly, Brittain was overruled when "[i]n 1998 the Utah , 
Legislature amended the Immunity Act, clarifying exactly to whom Notices must be directed 
and delivered." G reene v. Utah Transit Authority, 2 001 U T 1 09, 1J 1 3, 3 7 P 3d 1156 
(recognizing statutory overruling of Brittain). Thus, Plaintiffs5 argument based thereon fails. 
Plaintiffs next note "that the vast majority of the courts [in other jurisdictions] favor 
substantial compliance as the standard" and claims that "recent Utah decisions are consonant 
with such holdings." Plaintiffs cite only Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 
1980), in support of this latter assertion. Stahl held that only substantial compliance was 
required with respect to the Utah Public Transit District Act, not with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. See id. at 481-82. In fact, the Stahl court affirmed "[t]he 
express bar against maintaining an action for noncompliance with the notice provision 
in the Governmental Immunity Act" Id. at 481 (emphasis added). Thus, notwithstanding 
that other jurisdictions may not require strict compliance with their notice of claims 
provisions, Plaintiffs have cited no authority for the proposition that Utah law requires 
anything less than strict compliance. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs quote Busch v. Salt Lake Int 7 Airport, 921 P.2d 470,472 (Utah Ct 
App. 1996), wherein the court explains the "two important purposes" for the Governmental 
Immunity Act, and then argue that substantial compliance with the Acfs Notice of Claim 
requirements fulfills thtAcf s two purposes. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs5 argument, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held repeatedly and recently that the Notice of Claim requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act must be strictly complied with. See, e.g., Wheeler v. 
McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ^ 11,40 P.3d 632; Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 19, 
977 P.2d 1201. In fact, in Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, 2004 UT 
80,104 P 3d 118 5, the Utah Supreme Court held that although the plaintiffs filed their Notice 
of Claim with the mayor and city council, the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the 
Notice of Claim had not been "directed" to "the city or town recorder." Id. at f 38 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A) (Supp. 2003)) (emphasis in original); see id. atffi[ 
36-40. Likewise here, although Plaintiffs5 directed their Notice of Claim at the St. George 
City Mayor and City Council, they did not direct it to the City Recorder or Clerk. Thus, their 
Notice of Claim was not in strict compliance with the notice requirements of the A ct, and the 
Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice. 
5 
THE COURT ALSO LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN WAIVED FOR INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE 
INCARCERATION OF ANY PERSON OR FOR NEGLIGENT INSPECTIONS 
St. George Defendants demonstrated in their opening Memorandum that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims because those claims are for injury arising out of 
the incarceration of William Matthew Pace, and sovereign immunity is retained when the suit 
is for negligently caused injury arising out of the incarceration of any person. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (Supp. 2003). St. George Defendants likewise demonstrated in their 
opening Memorandum that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs5 claims because 
those claims are for injury arising out of the allegedly negligent search of Matthew Pace, and 
SOVEREIGN immunity is retained for injury resulting from ui inadequate or negligent 
inspection. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4).Thus, even if the Court were to decide that 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim was in strict compliance with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, the Court would still lack jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs5 claims. In their Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs do not even address these 
arguments. More importantly, Plaintiffs failure to respond to St. George Defendants5 
arguments is "fatal to [their] claims." Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, 19 Fed. Appx. 749, 769 
(10th Cir. 2001) ("[Plaintiff]5s failure to respond [to defendant's summary judgment 
argument] is fatal to his claims.55); see also, Teumer v. General Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 
545-46 (7th Cir. 1994)(same); Wilkinson v. Ellis, 4S4F.S\xpp. 1072,1078 n. 13(D.Pa. 1980) 
6 
(stating that plaintiff apparently conceded defendant's argument by not addressing it in 
response to defendant's motion to dismiss). Even if Plaintiffs' failure to respond to St. 
George Defendants' arguments in this regard is not alone fatal to their claims, the authority 
upon which St. George Defendants' rely is incontrovertible to the effect that sovereign 
immunity is retained "for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated person is in [jail] 
and under the control of [a governmental entity]." Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1978)(emphasis added). "Since [the] injury [complained of here] occurred while 
[the decedent] was under the control of [jail] officials, the governmental entities... are 
• . . immune from liability." Id.(emphasis added). The Court should therefore grant St. 
George Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See id. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2005. 
SUITTERAXLAND 
£_i 
fesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of August, 2005,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ST. GEORGE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS to be served via, first class United States mail, 
postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Matthew T. Graff, Esq. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
1957 West Royal Hunte Drive, Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
G:\7487\2\ReplyMemoSupptMotiontoDismiss.wpd 
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MATTHEW T. GRAFF (8605) 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1957 W. Royal Hunte Dr., Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (435)586-5115 
FAX: (435) 586-5118 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTIE PACE individually and for and on 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF 
THE ESTATE, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 050500378 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Oral Argument Requested 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Matthew T. Graff, hereby 
respectfully submit their Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss with supporting affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants have argued that the Notice of Claim requirement of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act requires the dismissal of this suit. Included herein is the affidavit 
of service and delivery of Summons and Complaint upon Gay Cragun. Gay Cragun was 
served with Summons and Complaint on the 3"* day of March, 2005 at 10:10 a.m. Gay 
Cragun represented to Jason Neal, the process server, that she is the proper person for 
service as the City Recorder of the City of St. George, in exact compliance with U.C. A. 
63-30-ll(3)(b)(ii)(A). (See, affidavit of Jason Neal). In the very words of the Reply 
Memorandum submitted by Defendants received August 11, 2005, "Plaintiffs did not direct or 
deliver their Notice of Claim to the St. George City Recorder or the St. George City Clerk." 
This statement is entirely erroneous, and proven by sworn affidavit already before this court. 
All of the foregoing information was already held by this court and also held by Defendants. 
The Motion to Dismiss alleging failure to comply with this provision of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act has wasted the time of this court and our law offices, and we 
hereby request the award of attorneys fees in an amount to be shown at trial. 
Jurisdiction is retained in this matter, and the provisions of Sovereign Immunity with 
regards to the incarceration of any person or for negligent inspections is, on its face, 
inapplicable here. Defendants quoted Madsen to assert that "sovereign immunity is retained 
'for any injuries occurring while the incarcerated person is in [jail] and under the control of a 
governmental entity."' The true holding of Madsen uses the word prison, rather than jail. In 
2 
their second citation to the case, they again replaced the word "prison" with "jail." We find it 
perplexing that Defendants decided to use different language than the true holding of the one 
case they cite in support of their claims to divest this court of jurisdiction. The word 
distinction is crucial and dispositive of this portion of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The 
deceased was not in prison, nor is the wording of the holding of Madsen applicable here. The 
deceased had only recently been read his Miranda rights and was using the bathroom on break 
from interrogation when he shot himself in the head. He had not been sentenced and was not 
incarcerated due to sentencing for a crime. 
With respect to the fatality of a claim for failure to respond to an argument within the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, such doctrine is applicable with respect to a 
claim, not jurisdiction. This court has exercised and may retain jurisdiction absent a rebuttal 
claim by Plaintiffs if jurisdiction is proper, as seen by the wording of Hinsdale (which 
wording was also interestingly omitted from the citation in Defendants' Motion). "Defendants 
. . . made an argument why summary judgment is appropriate as to a particular claim, which 
shifted the burden to Mr. Hinsdale, as nonmovant. Mr. Hinsdale's failure to respond is fatal to 
his claims." Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, 19 Fed. Appx. 749, 769 (10th Cir. 2001). In that case, 
the Plaintiff failed to respond to the substantive Section 1983 claims rebutted by the Defendants, 
and therefore those specific claims failed. Defendant has never included jurisdiction as a 
"claim", but we rather leave it to the discretion of this court to determine its propriety. As the 
courts determining jurisdiction within Utah inquire, "if the matter is to be determined on the 
documentary evidence alone, the plaintiff must simply make a prima facie showing of personal 
3 
jurisdiction. If there are material disputes in the documentary evidence, the matter must proceed 
to trial where the plaintiff must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Kamdar 
& Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). We rely on our assertions from prior 
pleadings that jurisdiction is, in fact, proper and challenge the position of the Defendants with 
regard to the same. At the time of trial, Defendants may collaterally attack jurisdiction under the 
standard of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' service was strictly compliant with the provisions of the UGIA. 
Jurisdiction is maintained properly within this court. In light of the foregoing, we 
respectfully request that this Court deny the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and for the 
award of attorneys fees in an amount to be determined at trail. ORAL ARGUMENT 
REQUESTED. 
DATED this day of August, 2005. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO DISMISS was mailed by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on this day of 
July, 2005, to the following: 
Shawn M. Guzman 
St. George City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, UT 84770 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Suitter Axland, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suitte 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Paralegal 
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EXHIBIT A 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
of the UnjSsSS tha!! i Z i ^ r * 7 *ET *"* *** * * * ™ E reS ident ° f t h e State' a n d a C i t i z e i 
taken. That at me^imof servSl d f / f a ' ^ T n<>t 3 P 3 l t y t 0 ° r in teres ted h a n y a c t i o n b e ^ 
and my name thereto 0R5e U p ° n t h e COpies left f o r t h e P e r s o n b e i ng s e r v e d> « * d*t< 
1 S C r V e d :
 -
J % - ^ ^ — _ _ _ _ _ 
Located at:__T75_£. . ^ ^ 
^ h ^ r ^ ° f ~ ^ W _ _ _ . 2005. At the hour of: / 0 : ,„ "_^m 
Who is the:
 ( X ) Defendant ( ') Plaintiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness ( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
EQaMEfffiSLSERVED: (») Summons and Complaint 
MANNER OF SFRVTri?. t K \ » 
a b o d e
 wi*^e^e^nifWhii } P e ^ n a ^ s e r v e d < > A t « * dwelling, house or usual place o 
( ) Bv deliverino IT ! Hge a n d dkcreti<>n «»ere residing. 
By p o s S a 2 ° *" ^  a U t h o r i z e d ^ aPP«^ment or by law to receive process 
y posting ,n a conspicuous manner (Upon the main entry point) 
COJMMENTS: 
CLIENT INFORMATION: 
Dated this: day of March, 2005. 
SUBSCRBED AND SWORN BEEORE & THIS: _ ^ _ day of JfajJ. 2005, 
Service FEPC 
SUcylMNtal 
1957 W toyafHunt* Dr., SU. 8W \ 
C*larCfty.UUhU72« 
My Committal Explrt c 
f "-^ iUV^ Stole «(UUh -, 
*1 ' ^ / l ^ ^ ^ ^ W A W C ^ ^ ^ T 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE AND DELIVERY 
of theU^i^, tha"U^S^S^J^ t h a ! l a m a res ident o f **State» « * a Cit 
taken. That at the time of servic/i L f,, y **' a m n o t a p a r t y t o o r interested in any action b, 
and my name thereto. d l d e n d o r a e u P o n t h e « * * * left for the person being served the i 
I served: 
J=^=tL 
Located at: / 7 £ <£, ^ ^ > A/. 
On the: ^ day of MJAKJ, 2005. 
At the hour of: $<. t/o A.m. 
Who is the: (/Q Defendant ( ) Plaintiff ( ) Garnishee ( ) Witness 
( ) Other ( ) Respondent 
DOCUMENTS) SERVED: (/0) Summons and Complaint 
MANNER OF SFRvrrp.
 r U , P o p C A „ 
COJflVffiNTS: 
CJiENXIN^QRJVlATJON: 
Dated this: J ^ day of March, 2005. 
Process Servey , , 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BEFORE ME THIS: H"™ 
2005. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF (8605) 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1957 W. Royal Hunte Dr., Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Telephone: (435)586-5115 
FAX: (435) 586-5118 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTIE PACE individually and for and on 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF 
THE ESTATE, 
Plaintiffs, 
V. 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, CITY OF ST. GEORGE, 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 050500378 
Judge Eric A. Ludlow 
Oral Argument Requested 
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, Matthew T. Graff, hereby 
respectfully submit their Supplemental Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Motion to File 
Supplemental Memorandum. 
Defense raises three issues in their Memorandum in Opposition. Plaintiffs will address 
each in turn. 
Defense first asserts that Plaintiffs are not in strict compliance with U.C.A. 63-30-
1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A)(2003). Notice of Claim, as filed by prior counsel Braunberger, Boud & Draper, 
was in fact proper, as it was directed and delivered to the known address of the city recorder as a 
duly filed Notice of Claim in accordance with the statute. The address it was mailed to was 175 
East 200 North, St. George, UT 84770. See attached exibit When a lawsuit is filed against a 
city, the city entity is served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the city 
recorder. Banford ex rel Banfordv. Quinley, 1999 WL 33244607 (Utah App., 1999). Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4. See also Busch v. Salt Lake Intern. Airport, 921 P.2d 470 (Utah App., 1996) (declaring 
that even if the notice of claim was insufficient, the cause of action cannot be time barred, and a 
conforming notice of claim can still be re-filed regardless). 
Concerning the mis-quotation of the holding of Madsen, Defendants replaced the word 
"jail" with "prison." Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978). Whether or not that is the 
correct holding of Madsen is currently at issue, but the citation in Defense's memorandum was 
intentionally altered from the true wording of the case. Considering that the statute contemplates 
incarceration, Plaintiff submits that an individual who is taking a break to urinate after 
interrogations is not contemplated under the statute. A prison, which is dramatically different 
than jail, is also substantively distinct from a detainee, or even a person willfully submitting to 
interrogatories by the Police. We further have no way of knowing the full status of the Plaintiff 
2 
in light of Defense's obstinacy with submitting to statutorily justified discovery. For all we have 
been informed by Defense, the Decedent may not have even been Mirandized at the time he shot 
himself in the head. Discovery is necessary to even go forward procedurally in this case and to 
ascertain what causes of action are to be properly pursued. (We have now requested a [statutorily 
unnecessary] Rule 26 conference with Defense two times with no response). 
With respect to the argument Defense set forth that the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act must waive sovereign jurisdiction over "her" claims, "she" has done so. "Immunity from 
suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment." U.C.A. 1953 § 63-
30d-301(3)(a)(4). This is the same argument Plaintiffs presented when Defense vehemently 
objected to our proper discovery requests of the tapes and materials documenting the suicide 
without a Rule 26 scheduling conference. This argument should not come as any surprise to 
Defense, although they have as of yet failed to properly address the issue, even though it is 
determinative of their duty to respond to our discovery requests and waives governmental 
immunity. Defense also again attempted to claim that a failure of Plaintiffs to respond to their 
arguments regarding a "waiver of sovereign immunity" somehow stripped this court of the 
jurisdiction to hear this suit. Jurisdiction of this court is not a "claim" made by the Defense 
for which Plaintiffs must raise a rebuttal. Defense wishes to strip this court of subject matter 
jurisdiction because of a failure to respond to an assertion of lack of jurisdiction in a pleading 
(claiming jurisdiction was improper due to the Governmental Immunity Act). Any such 
argument is untenable and is uniformly rejected in all jurisdictions. The U.S. Supreme Court 
3 
holding of Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,118 S.Ct. 1003 (U.S., 
1998) emphasized that subject matter jurisdiction is completely separate of all claims made by 
either party. "It is firmly established in our cases that the absence of a valid . . . cause of action 
does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts1 statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case." Under either theory (that immunity is waived, or that jurisdiction is not a 
claim), this court may hear this proceeding. 
We reiterate the position of Utah Courts regarding the use of procedural delays to avoid 
discovery. "When an administrative agency determines that a party has not complied with 
legitimate discovery requests due to willfulness, bad faith, fault, or persistent dilatory tactics 
frustrating the judicial process, the agency acts within its discretion in imposing sanctions. 
Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Com'n, 2002, 53 P.3d 11, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 2002 
UT App 254, certiorari denied 63P.3dl04, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 133, 540 U.S. 821, 157 
L.Ed.2d 40." See in general U.C.A. 1953 § 63-46b-7; "Procedures for formal adjudicative 
proceedings—Discovery and subpoenas." Although Plaintiffs do not at this time seek sanctions 
against Defendants, we ask that the court consider the legitimacy and substantive weight of the 
discovery requests issued by Plaintiffs in Subpoena form, the 2nd of March, 2005. Now, six 
months later, after a litany of non-substantive filings and memorandum, Defense is still 
unresponsive to any of our requests for scheduling conferences or requests to convene in any 
manner progressive to the discovery of any of the jealously guarded facts surrounding this 
embarrassment within a city organization. 
CONCLUSION 
4 
Plaintiffs' service was strictly compliant with the provisions of the UGIA, the 
misquotation of Defense's case holding improperly interprets the statutory intent, and 
Jurisdiction is maintained properly within this court. In light of the foregoing, we 
respectfully request that this Court grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File 
Supplemental Memorandum, and for the award of attorneys fees in an amount to be 
determined at trail. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED. 
<7$ 
DATED this [^\ day of September, 2005. 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES 
MATTHEW trt3ltAFF (_^> 
Attomeys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM was 
mailed by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on this /]AJ3-' day of September, 2005, to the 
following: 
Shawn M. Guzman 
St. George City Attorney 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, UT 84770 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
Michael W. Homer 
Suitter Axland, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Suitte 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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EXHIBIT #1 
BRAUNBERGER, BOUD & DRAPER, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Phone (801) 562-3200 Of Counsel 
Fax (801) 562-5250 Richard I. Ashton 
[Inactive] 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
July 2,2004 
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL AND REGULAR MAIL 
St. George Police Department 
200 East 265 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City of St. George 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Mayor Daniel McArthur 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member - Suzanne Allen 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Larry Gardner 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Rodney Orton 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
City Council Member- Robert Whatcott 
175 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Re: Our Client: Kristy Pace, widow to Matthew Pace 
Wayne H. Braunberger 
James R. Boud 
Tad D. Draper 
Troy K. Walker 
1 
Date of Incident: March 13,2004 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter shall serve as Notice of Claim upon the City of St. George pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et. seq. Further, governmental immunity is deemed waived in this matter. 
SECTION I 
Statement of Facts 
On March 13, 2004, an officer at the St. George Police Department, believed to be 
Officer Collard arranged for Matthew Pace to come into the police department for an interview 
regarding an alleged theft. At the time of the interrogation, the police department performed a 
pat down search on Matt Pace to check for weapons and presumably other potentially dangerous 
objects. It is also believed that Mr. Pace again underwent a second pat down search while in 
police custody. Subsequent to these searches, Mr. Pace asked to use the restroom. Accordingly, 
two St. George police officers escorted Mr. Pace to the restroom and stood, in presence, 
approximately 12 feet away while he was in the restroom facilities. At this time, he pulled a 
hand gun from his belt region and shot himself in the head. Mr. Pace died immediately. Mr. 
Pace was not searched with a magnetometer. 
SECTION II 
Nature of the Claim 
This claim is against the City of St. George, and more particularly the St. George Police 
Department for the wrongful death of William Matthew Pace, who, while under worry and duress 
while being in police custody, was not properly searched either manually, or through the use of a 
magnetometer for a dangerous weapon. The negligence of improperly searching and securing the 
safety of Mr. Pace directly resulted in his death, and the endangerment of other individuals in the 
police facility. The claim is brought by and through Kristy Pace, Mr. Pace's wife, and personal 
representative to his estate, both in her individual and personal representative capacity. The 
claim is asserted under one or more of the provisions of Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
SECTION III 
Injuries and Damages Sustained 
The injuries are, loss of support, companionship, society and other losses and injuries 
pertaining to a wrongful death action on behalf of Kristy Pace and the heirs of Matthew Pace. 
The compensable loss and damages resulting from the wrongful acts of the St. George Police 
Department include, but are not limited to the necessary and reasonable cost and loss associated 
with Mr. Pace's wrongful death, including funeral expenses and the economic loss, both present 
and future. The full value of this has not currently been determined, but would include a 
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calculation for present and future wage loss as well as general damages for pain, suffering, loss 
of society and companionship, which is not currently known, but will be established upon further 
discovery and investigation. 
SECTION IV 
Acknowledgment 
This Notice of Claim is intended to comply with the provisions set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-12 et seq. The undersigned is a duly authorized attorney of the Claimants by 
written agreement. 
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Attorneys for City of St. George, Utah and St. George City Police Dept 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KRISTTE PACE individually and fox and on 
behalf of THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM 
MATTHEW PACE and ALL HEIRS OF THE 
ESTATE, ; 
Plaintiffs, ; 
v. ; 
ST. GEORGE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, : 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, JOHN DOES 1 ; 
through 10, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 'CaseTfto'; 050500378 
) Judge James L. Schmate 
On November 1,2005, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on for a regularly 
scheduled hearing before the Honorable L. Shumate. Plaintiffs were represented at the 
hearing by Matthew T. Grafl. Defendants were represented by Jesse C. Trentadue. The 
Court having heard the arguments of counsel, being otherwise fully advise and these 
premises, does hereby grant Defendants" Motion to Dismiss. Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss is granted because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' 
claims due to Plaintiffs* failure to comply with the service of a. Notice of Claim in the 
Court is with the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code. Ann. § 
63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(A) (2003) and because this matter arises out of the incarceration of 
William Matthew Pace for which the State of Utah and its political subdivisions retain 
governmental immunity in accordance with Utah Code. Ann. § 63-30-10(10) (2003). 
This dismissal, however, is without prejudice since the Court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
Plaintiffs' Complainfbb and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice, each party to 
bear their respective costs and attorney's fees. 
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DATED this f 0 day of Januaiy, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
James L. Schmaie 
)isfrict Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the - 4 day of December, 2005,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS to be served via, first 
class United States mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 
Matthew T. Graf£ Esq. 
MATTHEW T. GRAKF & ASSOCIATES 
1957 West Royal Hunte Drive, Suite 200 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
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